Scholars Crossing
Faculty Publications and Presentations

Helms School of Government

2010

Richard Jackson and Neil Howe: The Graying of the Great Powers:
Study Guide
Steven Alan Samson
Liberty University, ssamson@liberty.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs
Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Samson, Steven Alan, "Richard Jackson and Neil Howe: The Graying of the Great Powers: Study Guide"
(2010). Faculty Publications and Presentations. 95.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/95

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at Scholars Crossing. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

RICHARD JACKSON AND NEIL HOWE: THE GRAYING
OF THE GREAT POWERS: STUDY GUIDE (2010)
Steven Alan Samson
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080630_gai_majorfindings.pdf
Study Questions
1.

What does this report explain? What are its major findings?

Major Findings: The Demographic Transformation
2.

What is the significance of a high median age, whether 30, 40, or 50? What is the significance
of a growing number of countries that have shrinking populations? What is meant by
demographic momentum and why is it significant? Which countries are projected to experience
the least aging?

3.

Discuss three types of economic, social, and political consequences of the demographic
transformation that could undermine the ability of the United States and its traditional allies to
maintain security. What impact is smaller family size likely to have on preparedness for war?

4.

What countries (at the opportunity end of the spectrum) are likely to be favored by a
“demographic dividend?” What parts of the world fall closer to the challenge end with youth
bulges and chronic civil unrest? Where might political crises be triggered?

Major Findings: The Geopolitical Implications
5.

Why is the global influence of the developed world likely to decline? What will it need to do to
fortify its global position? Why is the population and GDP of the United States likely to expand
steadily as a share of the developed world totals? What country is likely to remain at the same
population ranking during the next four decades?

6.

What is a youth bulge? What might help some nations break the cycle of high fertility and high
poverty? Compared with the youth bulge countries of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Muslim
world, why are some of the rapidly modernizing “fast-transitioning countries” likely to face even
more serious crises?

7.

Why will religious conflict become an even more serious global problem? Why are the 2020s
likely to emerge as the decade of maximum geopolitical danger for the developed world? Why is
a “youth echo boom” likely to be a problem during that period? What light is shed on the
situation by the “power transition” theories of global conflict? What chronic shortages are likely
to be faced by aging develop countries? What will render many developed countries “permanent
free riders on their allies?”
NOTE: Fewer (2004) by Ben J. Wattenberg provides a realistic assessment of the dangers we
face. I included the following in a lecture I gave in April 2007. On page 37 Wattenberg writes:
“Consider Europe according to ‘Replacement Migration’ [a 2001 publication of the UN Population
Division]: Today Europe has more than twice as many people as the United States, but the whole
continent takes in a net of 376,000 immigrants per year, about a third of the American number. In
order to keep a total constant population, that European immigration number would have to rise
to 1,917,000 per year, an annual increase of more than 500 percent. To maintain a constant age
group of workers age 15-64, the number of immigrants would have to rise to 3,227,000 per year,
an annual increase of more than 900 percent. The UNPD also calculated what it would take to

keep the dependency ratio constant, that is, the proportions of working-age persons to those over
age 65 and under 15. That would require an annual immigration of 27,139,000, an increase of
more than 7,100 percent. That is not likely to happen.”
Wattenberg’s numbers merely represent the numbers of people who may be required for the
maintenance of an aging, affluent population: that is, the amount of additional workers that is
required simply to pass along a real inheritance rather than a deficit to future generations. But
even if such high levels of immigration were possible, would they be desirable? How could any
society, especially one seeks to preserve its character, begin to assimilate all the nannies,
gardeners, nurses, and other workers needed simply to maintain the status quo or to preserve the
infrastructure? See “The Grapes of Parnassos”: http://works.bepress.com/steven_samson/51/
9.

What is likely to change the widespread support for the “soft power” of liberal democracy and the
global democratic order? How might illiberal neo-authoritarian regimes win popularity?

A Framework for Policy Action
10.

What are some of the authors’ policy recommendations?

Review
high median age
youth echo boom
neo-authoritarian regimes

demographic transformation
power (hegemonic) transition

youth bulge
liberal democracy

Appendix: Statistical Comparisons from the United Nations Population Division:
World Population Prospects: the 2006 Revision (Excerpts)
TABLE I:2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD POPULATION BY DEVELOPMENT GROUP AND MAJOR
AREA, 1950, 1975, 2007 and 2050, ACCORDING TO PROJECTION VARIANT (PERCENTAGE)
Population
Major Area

1950

1975

2007

More Developed

32.1

25.7

18.3

Less Developed

67.9

74.3

81.7

TABLE I:3. AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION CHANGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN
BROAD AGE GROUPS BY MAJOR AREAS, MEDIUM VARIANT, 2005-2050 (PERCENTAGE)
Age

0-14

15-59

60+

80+

Total
Population
0.76

World

-0.03

0.65

2.43

3.38

Europe

-0.41

-0.70

0.93

2.02

-0.21

N. America

0.25

0.38

1.73

2.42

0.65

TABLE II:1. ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY FOR THE WORLD, MAJOR
DEVELOPMENT GROUPS AND MAJOR AREAS, 1970-1975, 2005-2010 AND 2045-2050, ACCORDING
TO VARIANTS
Total Fertility (average number of children per woman)

1970-1975

2005-2010

2045-2050 (low)

World

4.47

2.55

1.54

Europe

2.16

1.45

1.26

Northern America

2.01

2.00

1.35

